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Abstract
Web Search engines have become an indispensable online service to retrieve content on the Internet. However,
using search engines raises serious privacy issues as the latter gather large amounts of data about individuals through
their search queries. Two main techniques have been proposed to privately query search engines. A first category of
approaches, called unlinkability, aims at disassociating the query and the identity of its requester. A second category of
approaches, called indistinguishability, aims at hiding user’s queries or user’s interests by either obfuscating user’s
queries, or forging new fake queries. This paper presents a study of the level of protection offered by three popular
solutions: Tor-based, TrackMeNot, and GooPIR. For this purpose, we present an efficient and scalable attack – SimAttack
– leveraging a similarity metric to capture the distance between preliminary information about the users (i.e., history
of query) and a new query. SimAttack de-anonymizes up to 36.7 % of queries protected by an unlinkability solution
(i.e., Tor-based), and identifies up to 45.3 and 51.6 % of queries protected by indistinguishability solutions (i.e.,
TrackMeNot and GooPIR, respectively). In addition, SimAttack de-anonymizes 6.7 % more queries than state-of-the-art
attacks and dramatically improves the performance of the attack on TrackMeNot by 23.6 %, while retaining an
execution time faster by two orders of magnitude.
Keywords: Privacy, Web search, Unlinkability, Indistinguishability
1 Introduction
Search engines (e.g., Google, Bing, Yahoo!) have become
the preferred way for users to find content on the Inter-
net. However, by repetitively querying for a large number
of topics and websites, users disclose a large amount of
personal data to these search engines. Consequently, the
latter are able to create accurate knowledge on users by
extracting their personal interests from their queries. Even
though all user queries are not related to sensitive topics,
this automated data processing about individuals raises a
serious privacy issue, as users cannot control the use of
their personal data and have no right to be forgotten. To
deal with this issue, many solutions have been proposed
to enforce private Web search. These solutions can be
mainly classified into two categories. The first one, called
unlinkability, consists in hiding the user’s identity from
the search engine (typically her IP address). Anonymous
communication protocols (e.g., Onion Routing [1], TOR
[2], Dissent [3, 4], RAC [5]) are the main solutions enforc-
ing this property. The second type of solutions, called
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indistinguishability, aims at either altering the user’s
queries or hiding the user’s interests. For instance,
GooPIR [6] adds extra queries to the original query while
TrackMeNot [7] sends periodically fake queries.
Despite these solutions improve the user privacy,
a previous study [8] using a machine learning algo-
rithm and preliminary information about the user (i.e.,
part of its query history) shows that an adversary is
able to break both categories of solutions. However,
this study was conducted using only 60 specific users
(i.e., users who issued queries with a given number
of keywords or queries considered as sensitive by the
authors) and considering non-active users (called “other
user” in the study). Consequently, it is not clear if an
adversary is still able to break these unlinkability and
indistinguishability solutions for active users. As active
users can expose more information to the adversary,
they represent the most difficult category of users to
protect.
To better understand the limits of unlinkability and
indistinguishability solutions on individual’s privacy, we
present in this paper a study of private Web search solu-
tions focusing on active users. This study is conducted
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with SimAttack, an efficient attack that leverages a
similarity metric to capture the distance between a query
and user profiles. These user profiles gather preliminary
information about the users collected by the adversary.
While the original version of SimAttack [9] was designed
for a specific target, this paper presents a generaliza-
tion of this attack for unlinkability and indistinguishability
solutions.
We exhaustively evaluated our new SimAttack on three
popular solutions: Tor-based, TrackMeNot, and GooPIR.
Our experiments used real world Web search datasets
involving up to 15,000 users. We show that SimAttack
scales particularly well with respect to the number of users
considered in the system. More precisely, compared to the
previous machine learning attacks, SimAttack divides by
158 and 100 the execution time considering respectively
1,000 users protected by an unlinkability solution and
100 users protected by TrackMeNot. Moreover, SimAt-
tack succeeds to de-anonymize as many users queries
as the machine learning attack for unlinkability solu-
tions, and identify up to 45.3 % of initial queries for
TrackMeNot.
Finally, the generic nature of SimAttack based on a simi-
larity distance between pre-built user profiles and a query
allows an adversary to design attacks for others private
Web search solutions.
For instance, we leverage SimAttack to evaluate the
privacy protection offered by GooPIR. We succeed to
identify at least 50.6 % of initial queries protected by this
solution even if they were protected by 7 fake queries. Last
but not least, as we show in our study that the previous
aforementioned solutions (i.e., Tor-based, TrackMeNot,
and GooPIR) do not protect properly the user privacy, we
also analyze hybrid private Web search solutions: GooPIR
over an unlinkability solution and TrackMeNot over an
unlinkability solution.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we present the state-of-the-art approaches.
In Section 3, we describe the considered adversary
model. In Section 4, we detail SimAttack and how it is
able to break unlinkability solutions, indistinguishabil-
ity solutions and their combinations. We then present
our experimental set-up in Section 5 before evaluat-
ing the robustness of unlinkability solutions, Track-
MeNot, GooPIR and hybrid solutions in Section 6, 7,
8 and 9, respectively. Finally, Section 10 concludes the
paper.
2 Related work
The main solutions to privately query search engines
can be classified in two categories: (i) systems ensur-
ing unlinkability between requesters and their queries,
and (ii) systems guaranteeing indistinguishability of user
interests. Privacy-aware mechanism can be also directly
implemented on the search engine side through Private
Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols.
2.1 Unlinkability solutions
One approach to protect the user privacy from a too
curious search engine is to prevent the latter from iden-
tifying the real identity of users. The identity of users
is tracked through multiple techniques such as the IP
address, quasi-identifiers (e.g., cookies), or fingerprints
(e.g., HTTP headers, set of browser plugins [10]). While
quasi-identifiers can be removed as suggested in [11], a
basic solution to hide the IP address consists in lever-
aging a Proxy [12] or a VPN [13] server as relay. This
distant server forwards user queries to the search engine
on behalf of the user and returns results to the user. Unfor-
tunately, this mechanism only shifts the privacy problem
from the search engine to the relay which can collect and
analyze queries from users.
Anonymous networks (e.g., Onion Routing [1], Tor
[2], Dissent [3, 4], RAC [5]) represents a more com-
plex approach to prevent a third party to map a user
identity to a query. Indeed, anonymous network lever-
ages onion routing and path forwarding to route user
queries throughmultiple nodes before reaching the search
engine. However, this approach relies on either a high
number of cryptographic operations (e.g., Tor-based solu-
tions), or all-to-all communication (e.g., RAC andDissent)
which generate a costly overhead in terms of latency and
network traffic. These important overheads make anony-
mous networks impractical for interactive tasks such as
Web search.
Other techniques try to achieve the same goal using a
fully decentralized architecture. For instance, [14] and [15]
proposed a protocol in which users exchange their queries
in a privacy-preserving way (i.e., users do not know who
issued which queries) and send them on behalf of each
other. As the identity of the initial requester is unknown
by the search engine and the other users, the results must
be broadcasted to all the users. Therefore, these solu-
tions generate significant overheads in terms of traffic and
latency.
2.2 Indistinguishability solutions
Indistinguishability solutions consist in making the search
engine only able to collect inaccurate users’ queries and
interests. Consequently, as the users’ interests cannot be
truly discovered, the privacy of users is preserved. A
popular solution in this category, TrackMeNot [7], period-
ically sends fake queries on behalf the user. The challenge
in this approach is to create fake queries that cannot
be distinguished from the real ones. To do so, Track-
MeNot (TMN) based the generation of fake queries on
RSS feeds. However, as these RSS feeds are set up by
default or manually by the user, an adversary could be able
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to distinguish real queries from fake ones. For instance,
in [16] authors present a simple clustering attack over
small time windows that enables an adversary to retrieve
fake queries. Besides, other solutions adopt a similar tech-
nique: Plausibly Deniable Search (PDS) [17] generates k
plausibly deniable queries which are similar to previous
user queries but on different topics. Optimized Query
Forgery (OQF) [18] provides a theoretical approach to
generate fake queries by measuring the Kullback-Leibler
divergence between the user profile and the population
distribution. Noise Injection for Search Privacy Protec-
tion (NISSP) [19] (another similar approach to OQF) gives
a theoretical property that optimal fake queries should
respect. However, these four solutions (TMN, PDS, OQF
and NISSP) might overload the network by generating a
large number of fake queries.
Another possibility to achieve indistinguishability is to
modify the initial query. For instance, GooPIR [6] adds
to the initial query (k − 1) fake queries (generated using
a dictionary) where all of these queries are separated by
the logical OR operation in a new obfuscated query. As
GooPIR’s authors consider that an adversary has no back-
ground knowledge about the user, this adversary can only
guess the initial query with a probability equal to 1/k.
However, we present in Section 4 an efficient attack that
is able to retrieve the initial query with a high probabil-
ity considering user profiles preliminary created with their
past queries. Another technique called Query Scrambler
(QS) [20] protects the user by sending, instead of the
initial query, a set of new queries built by generalizing
the concepts of the initial query. Then, by filtering all
the results, QS retrieves potential results related to the
initial query. However, despite similar queries and the
filtering approach proposed, the accuracy of the results
remains low compared to the results obtained by issuing
the original query.
A new approach using multiple HTTP cookies has been
proposed to protect the user privacy while keeping the
search engine able to store information about the activ-
ity of users. In this solution, the search engine splits user
queries in multiple group profiles according to cookie sent
with the query. Nevertheless, this approach supposes that
a search engine only uses cookies to identify users and
does not take into consideration other elements such as
the IP address, the HTTP header, or other fingerprints.
Besides, by splitting queries in multiple user profiles, this
method only decreases the disclosure of information.
2.3 Private information retrieval
Search engines can implement Private Information
Retrieval (PIR) protocols to offer privacy preserving query
service to users. For instance, [21] presents a system in
which the query is broken down in multiple buckets of
words and then, the user uses homomorphic encryption
to retrieve search results without revealing her initial
query. However, this scheme faces many limitations to
be adopted in practice (i.e., costly homomorphic encryp-
tion and it requires specific implementation at the search
engine side).
3 Adversary model
Users are more and more concerned about the privacy
risks of querying search engines. In this paper, we analyze
the robustness of popular private Web search solutions.
We considered three categories of solutions: unlinkabil-
ity solutions, indistinguishability solutions, and indistin-
guishability solutions over unlinkability solutions. In our
approach, we assumed an adversary which aims to retrieve
for each protected query, both the content of the initial
query and the identity of the associated user.Moreover, we
assumed an adversary which was able to collect prelimi-
nary information about the interests of each user in the
system. This preliminary information are stored in user
profile structures. Preliminary information of users can
be collected in different manners, from their social net-
works activity, from their posts on blogs or discussions
on forums 1. In this paper, we considered as preliminary
information a part of the history of query of users.
In practice, our adversary model can be seen as a search
engine receiving protected queries from users who just
start to adopt a private Web search solution. In this
use case, the preliminary information represent the non-
protected queries sent by the users to the search engine
before the exploitation of a private Web search solution.
Consequently, the most active users have exposed more
preliminary information to the search engine through
their past querying activity.
4 SimAttack
In this section, we present SimAttack, an attack against
private Web search solutions. SimAttack computes a dis-
tance between an incoming query and the preliminary
information collected by the adversary (i.e., user profiles).
As consequence, according to this similarity distance, the
adversary is able to de-anonymize the query or differ-
entiate the fake queries from real ones. SimAttack is a
user-centric attack which tries to compromise the privacy
of each user independently. In this paper, we generalized
the original version of SimAttack [9] for unlinkability and
indistinguishability solutions.
Compared to existing attacks, SimAttack is generic and
can be adapted against all types of private Web search
solutions. Indeed, by defining the user profile and the
considered similarity metric, an adversary can personalize
SimAttack to any type of protections.
The next sections explain how the similarity between
a user profile and a query is computed, and detail how
SimAttack is able to break several types of protection
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mechanism based on unlinkability, indistinguishability,
and indistinguishability over unlinkability.
4.1 Similarity metric between a query and a user profile
We create a similarity metric sim(q,Pu) to characterize
the proximity between a query q and a user profile Pu. As
mentioned in [22], vector space model is widely used for
text representation. Thus, we model the query q as a vec-
tor where each dimension corresponds to a separate term.
For each dimension, the value of the vector is either 0 or
1 (i.e., 0 means that the keyword is not used in the query
while 1 means that the keyword is used in the query). Let
us define a user profile Pu as a set of queries (i.e., a set of
word vectors). The similarity metric sim(q,Pu) returns a
value between 0 and 1 where greater values indicate that
the query is close to the user’s profile. It is computed as
presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Similarity metric between a query and a
user profile
input: q : a query,
Pu : profile of user u (history of query issued by
u),
α : a smoothing factor.
1 for qi ∈ Pu do
2 coef [ i]← 2 · |q ∩ qi| · 1|qi|+|q| ;
3 coef ← sort(coef );
4 sim ← coef [ 0] ;
5 for i ∈ 1, |Pu| do
6 sim ← α · coef [ i]+(1 − α) · sim
7 return sim ;
It first computes the value coef [ i] corresponding to the
Dice’s coefficient [23] between the query q and the query
qi stored in Pu, the profile of user u (line 2). As defined
in Section 3, this profile contains part of the history of
query already issued by the user and preliminary col-
lected by the adversary. The coefficients coef [ i] are then
ranked in ascending order (line 3). The similarity metric
sim(q,Pu) is finally computed as the exponential smooth-
ing of these coefficients (lines 4 to 6). Consequently, this
similarity depends on the smoothing factor α that enables
to change the weight given to the coefficients. This param-
eter α takes its value between 0 and 1. In practice, the
value of α does not strongly impact the results as shown
in Section 6.1. Furthermore, we consider the Dice’s coef-
ficient which gives slightly better results than other sim-
ilarity metrics (e.g., cosine similarity [22], Jaccard index
[24]). As shown in our evaluations, although SimAttack is
faster than concurrent approaches, the time required to
perform the attack must remain as short as possible. The
Dice’s coefficient provides a good trade off between per-
formance against execution time compared to edit-based
and more complex token-based metrics [25].
4.2 Unlinkability attack
The de-anonymization attack consists in finding the iden-
tity of the requester of a specific query. Algorithm 2
describes this attack. For each user profile Pu previously
collected by the adversary, it computes its similarity with
the query q (line 3). It then returns the identity id corre-
sponding to the profile with the highest similarity. If the
highest similarity equals 0 (i.e., all similarities equal 0), the
identity of the requester remains unknown and the attack
is unsuccessful. Otherwise, the algorithm considers the
user, id, as the issuer of the query q.
Algorithm 2: De-anonymization Solutions Attack
input: q : a query,
U : set of users.
1 id ← u0 ;
2 for ui ∈ U do
3 if sim(q,Pui) > sim(q,Pid) then id ← ui
4 if sim(q,Pid) > 0 then return id else return ∅
4.3 Indistinguishability attack
The attack against indistinguishability solutions aims to
identify initial queries among faked or obfuscated queries
received by the search engine. Contrary to the previous
attack, the adversary knows the identity of the user and
thus tries to pinpoint fake queries by analyzing the sim-
ilarity between queries and the user profile. The attack
detailed in the Algorithm 3 proceeds as follow. It first
determines which obfuscation mechanism is being used.
More precisely, it checks if the obfuscated query q+ con-
tains several fakes queries separated by the logical OR
operator (line 1) (i.e., behavior of GooPIR). It might appear
that the logical OR operator was introduced by the user in
her query (and not by the obfuscation mechanism). Nev-
ertheless, as the user query and all fake queries have the
same number of keywords, it is easy in most of cases to
detect if the logical OR was introduced by the user or the
obfuscation mechanism.
Let us consider the first case in which the query q+ is
composed of k+1 queries (i.e., the initial query and k fake
queries). The algorithm extracts each aggregated query
qi from q+ and computes the similarity metric between
these aggregated queries qi and the user profile Pu (lines 3
and 4). Then it stores the query with the highest similarity
in the variable q′. If the similarity sim(q′,Pu) is different
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from 0, the algorithm returns q′ as the initial request. Oth-
erwise, the attack fails and the initial query is not retrieved
as the (k + 1) queries are not similar to any user profile.
On the second case (i.e., the query does not contain
the logical OR operator), it distinguishes two cases: if the
adversary has a prior knowledge about RSS feeds used by
the user to generate the fake queries or not. If we consider
first that the adversary does not have this external knowl-
edge, it evaluates if the similarity between the query q+
and the user profile Pu is greater than a given threshold δ.
If so, then q+ is considered as a real query, and is therefore
returned (line 8). Otherwise, the query is considered to be
a fake query (line 11).
Algorithm 3: Indistinguishability Solutions Attack
input: q+ : a query,
Pu : a user profile,
δ : a threshold,
PFQ : a profile of fake queries.
1 if q+ = q0 OR ... OR qk then
// q+ contains fake queries (i.e.,
GooPIR)
2 q′ ← q0 ;
3 for qi ∈ q+ do
4 if sim(qi,Pu) > sim(q′,Pu) then q′ ← qi
5 if sim(q′,Pu) > 0 then return q′
6 else
// q+ is either a fake query or a
real query (i.e., TrackMeNot)
7 if PFQ = ∅ then
8 if sim(q+,Pu) > δ then return q+
9 else
10 if sim(q+,Pu) > sim(q+,PFQ) then return
q+
11 return ∅ ;
// q+ is a fake query
Conversely, if we consider the situation where the adver-
sary knows the RSS feeds used by the user to generate
the fake queries, the adversary generates fake queries
using these predefined RSS feeds. These fake queries are
stored in a profile PFQ (same structure as a user profile
Pu). Then, the adversary uses this external knowledge to
distinguish fake queries (line 10). It first compares the
similarity between the query q+ and the user profile Pu
(i.e., sim(q+,Pu)) against the similarity between the query
q+ and the profile of fake queries PFQ (i.e., sim(q+,PFQ)).
If sim(q+,Pu) is greater than sim(q+,PFQ), q+ is closer
to the user profile than the profile of fake queries. Con-
sequently, q+ is considered as a real query, and is then
returned. Otherwise, the query is considered to be a fake
query (line 11).
4.4 Indistinguishability over an unlinkability solution
attack
The attack that breaks an indistinguishability solution
over an unlinkability solution combines the two pre-
vious attacks. The attack aims at identifying both the
initial requester and the initial query. To achieve that,
it follows the Algorithm 4. As the attack presented in
Algorithm 3, the Algorithm 4 first determines which
obfuscation mechanism is being used by looking for log-
ical OR operators (line 1). In that case, it first extracts
the (k + 1) queries qi from q+ and then retrieves for
each query qi, its potential requester id[ i] by invoking
Algorithm 2 (lines 2 to 3). Then, it removes queries
which are not associated to a potential requester (lines 5
to 6), i.e. queries for which Algorithm 2 was unsuccess-
ful. We denote the set of indexes corresponding to the
remaining queries by I. Finally, if I contains one ele-
ment a (i.e., only one query is associated to a potential
requester), it returns the pair (qa, id[ a] ) corresponding
to the initial query qa and to the initial requester id[ a]
(lines 7 to 9).
However, if I contains at least two elements, it retrieves
the pairs (qa, id[ a] ) and (qb, id[ b]) which have the high-
est similarity over I and evaluates the difference between
them (i.e., sim(qa,Pid[a]) − sim(qb,Pid[b])). To ensure a
certain confidence in the results, if this difference is too
small, the attack is thus unsuccessful, as the algorithm
retrieves at least two pairs of query and requester, and
it is not able to clearly identify the real one. However,
if the difference is greater than a threshold (initialized
at 0.01 by default), it returns the pair (qa, id[ a]) cor-
responding to the initial query qa and to the initial
requester id[ a] which maximizes sim(qa,Pid[a]) over I
(lines 10 to 14).
When queries do not contain OR operators, the algo-
rithm first retrieves the potential requester id by calling
the Algorithm 2 (line 16). If this id is not empty (i.e., if the
attack made by the Algorithm 2 is successful), it distin-
guishes two cases depending if the adversary has a prior
knowledge about RSS feeds used by the user. As men-
tioned in the previous section, if the adversary is able
to generate fake queries, she creates a profile PFQ (simi-
lar to user profile Pu) that contains a set of fake queries.
Let us consider the first case in which the adversary does
not have this knowledge (lines 18 to 19). The adversary is
able to distinguish between fake queries and real ones by
comparing the similarity between the query q+ and the
user profile Pid (i.e., sim(q+,Pid)) with the threshold δ. If
sim(q+,Pid) is greater than δ, the query is considered as a
real query sent by the user id and thus, the pair (q+, id) is
returned.
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Now, if we consider that the adversary is able to generate
a set of fake queries (lines 20 to 22). The algorithm deter-
mines if the similarity distance between the query q+ and
the user profile Pid (i.e., sim(q+,Pid)) is greater than the
similarity metric between the query q+ and the profile of
fake queries PFQ (i.e., sim(q+,PFQ)). In that case, the pair
(q+, id) is respectively considered as the initial query and
the initial requester and returned by the algorithm. Oth-
erwise, as no pair has been returned, the attack is either
unsuccessful or the query is considered as a fake query
(line 23).
Algorithm 4: Indistinguishability over unlinkability
Attack
input: q+ : a query,
U : set of users,
δ : a threshold
PFQ : a profile of fake queries.
1 if q+ = q0 OR ... OR qk then
// q+ contains fake queries
2 for qi ∈ q+ do
3 id[ i]← Algorithm_2(qi,U);
4 I ← 0, k;
5 for i ∈ 0, k do
6 if id[ i]= ∅ then I ← I\{i}
7 if |I| = 1 then
8 a ∈ I;
9 return (qa, id[ a] );
10 else if |I| > 1 then
11 a ← index s.t. sim(qa,Pid[a]) is maximal over
I;
12 b ← index s.t. sim(qb,Pid[b]) is maximal over
I\{a};
13 if sim(qa,Pid[a]) − sim(qb,Pid[b]) > 0.01 then
14 return (qa, id[ a] );
15 else
// q+ does not contain fake
queries
16 id ← Algorithm_2(q+,U);
17 if id = ∅ then
18 if PFQ = ∅ then
19 if sim(q+,Pid) > δ then return (q+, id)
20 else
21 if sim(q+,Pid) > sim(q+,PFQ) then
22 return (q+, id)
23 return ∅ ; // the attack is unsuccessful
or q+ is a fake query
5 Experimental set-up
In this section, we provide the experimental set-up of
our evaluation: the datasets, an overview of the consid-
ered indistinguishability solutions (i.e., TrackMeNot and
GooPIR), and both the evaluation metrics and the con-
current approaches we use to assess the performance
of SimAttack. All our experiments were conducted on a
commodity desktop workstation with a 2.2 GHz quad core
processor with 8 GB of memory.
5.1 Web search dataset
To evaluate the robustness of private Web search solu-
tions, we use a real world Web search dataset from AOL
Web search logs [26] published in 2006. AOL dataset
contains approximately 21 million queries formulated by
650,000 users over three months (March, April and May
of 2006). As this dataset contains many inactive users
(i.e., users that issued too few queries), we first filtered
the whole dataset to target active users. More precisely,
we select users that: (i) sent queries on at least 45 differ-
ent days (i.e., half of the dataset period), and (ii) issued
queries on a period of at least 61 days (i.e., two-thirds of
the dataset period). Finally, after this filtering phase, our
dataset gathers 18,164 users who issued from 62 queries
to 3,156 queries over the dataset period.
We then focus on the most active users as they are the
most exposed to an adversary. We create 5 datasets con-
taining different number of active users (from 100 to 1,000
users): AOL100, AOL200, AOL300, AOL500, AOL1000.
To do that, we order the 18,164 users according to the
number of queries they issued and then select the top
1,000 users to create the dataset AOL1000. We then gen-
erate the 4 other datasets as a subset of AOL1000. To
retain similar statistical properties and ensure that users
issued a significant number of queries, we generate these
4 datasets by choosing randomly (according to the dis-
tribution of the number of queries per user) the desired
number of users (e.g., 100 users for AOL100). Figure 1
depicts the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of
Fig. 1 Distribution of the number of queries issued per user for the
different dataset
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the number of queries issued by user in these 5 datasets.
These CDF show that users part of these datasets issued
at least 500 queries. We also note that each of these 5
datasets follows approximately the same distribution.
In addition, to assess private Web search solutions with
a larger number of users, we create 3 extra datasets con-
taining the top 5,000, 10,000 and 15,000 users: AOL5000,
AOL10000 and AOL15000. Figure 1 shows that these 3
datasets do not follow the previous distribution of queries
per user due to the lack of high active users in the AOL
dataset. However, results obtained with these datasets
give a lower bound as having more queries in the user
profile would likely increases the efficiency of the attack.
Finally, we pre-process and filter the queries of users
to remove the irrelevant keywords. To achieve that, we
leverage the Stanford CoreNLP library [27]. Using the tok-
enizer, we split queries in string vectors and then remove
stop words (i.e., articles and short function words) and
irrelevant keywords. Irrelevant keywords are identified
with the Named Entity Tagger and the Part-Of-Speech
Tagger. The former enables the recognition of names or
numerical and temporal entities while the latter recog-
nizes the function of the word. As consequence, numbers,
dates or pronouns are removed. Lastly, we stem each key-
word by eliminating or replacing the suffix using Porter
algorithm [28].
As mentioned in Section 3, we considered that the
adversary has already built a user profile for each user.
Consequently, we split each dataset in two parts: a train-
ing set used to build the user profiles, and a testing set
used to assess the robustness of the considered privacy-
preserving mechanism. We used two third of user queries
to create the training set and the remaining third of
queries to create the testing set. We used two third of user
queries to create the training set, and the remaining third
of queries to create the testing set.
5.2 TrackMeNot
TrackMeNot, called TMN in the rest of the paper, is a
Firefox plugin which periodically generates fake queries
to hide user queries in a stream of related queries. After
the installation of TMN, the user can define different
settings to select the desired level of protection. Two
main parameters impact the user protection: the RSS feed
lists and the delay between two fake queries. The RSS
feeds list is composed by default of four RSS feeds com-
ing from: cnn.com, nytimes.com, msnbc.com and
theregister.co.uk. The user can modify this list to
remove or add extra RSS feeds. Modifying this setting is
crucial, as keeping the initial list might help an adversary
to distinguish between real queries and fake ones. How-
ever, it is not trivial for users to find good RSS feeds,
as they should find RSS feeds that cover all their ever
changing interests. Moreover, the user can customize the
protection by choosing the time between two fake queries.
TMN offers several possibilities: from 10 fake queries per
minute to 1 fake query per hour. Consequently, the users
are able to chose the quantity of noise they want to intro-
duce in their queries. Also, the user could activate the
“burst mode”. In that case, when the user issues a query,
TMN sends in the same time multiple fake queries to
cover it.
To generate these fake queries, TMN transforms titles
of articles listed in RSS feeds into queries. To do so, it ran-
domly extracts keywords from a title and aggregate them
into a fake query. The number of keywords is randomly
chosen between 1 and 6. As a direct consequence, for a
given title, this algorithm is able to create multiple fake
queries and thus, two TMN users using the same RSS
feeds do not systematically create the same fake queries.
Finally, to simulate users using TMN, we need to add
fake queries to the datasets created in Section 5.1. To
do that, we create our own implementation of TMN to
generated the fake queries. We thus collected RSS feeds
from the TMN default setting during one month and half
(from August 28th, 2014 to October 9th, 2014), and we
generate fake queries from the 13,878 news titles that we
extracted. Additionally, we need to specify the number of
fake queries that we want to generate. To do so, we con-
sider that users used their computers 8 hours a day and
have set up 60 queries per hour. Consequently, we gener-
ate 14,880 fake queries per users (i.e., 60 queries× 8 hours
× 31 days).We call TMN100 this new dataset that contains
the queries of AOL100 plus 1,488,000 fake queries.
To ensure that the generated fake queries (built from
RSS feeds captured in 2014) are using similar terms that
users cared to look for in 2006, we compute the overlap
between the words used in fake queries and the words
used in the whole AOL dataset. We found out that 85.6
% of words used in fake queries are also contained in the
AOL dataset (6,918 words out 8,082).
Furthermore, we also generate fake queries for the
adversary (i.e., profile of fake queries PFQ defined in
Section 4.3). To do that, we generate the same number of
fake queries for the adversary as for users (i.e., 14,880 fake
queries).
5.3 GooPIR
GooPIR (Google Private Information Retrieval) is a Java
program to query Google in a privacy-preserving way.
This protection mechanism can also be used with other
search engine but only Google is supported by the applica-
tion. GooPIR obfuscates user queries by adding extra fake
queries separated by the logical OR operation. GooPIR
uses a dictionary to generate these fake queries. It can
exploit any type of dictionary – in the current imple-
mentation news articles from WikiNews are used but
GooPIR’s authors mentioned that query logs can also be
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used. By default, GooPIR creates three fake queries but
users can manually set up this number.
To generate k fake queries, GooPIR selects for each key-
word of the initial query, k words using the dictionary.
All these k selected words have a similar usage frequency
than the keyword in the initial query. Consequently, if the
initial query is composed of n keywords, GooPIR selects
k×nwords and then creates k fake queries of nwords (i.e.,
fake queries and user’s queries have the same number of
keywords).
Query answers returned by Google contain results
related to the initial query but also to the fake ones.
As a consequence, GooPIR implements a filtering phase
that tries to remove irrelevant results introduced by fake
queries. This algorithm tests for each result if its title or
its description contains keywords of the initial queries. If
so, the result is displayed, it is discarded otherwise.
In our experiments, to implement the behavior of
GooPIR, we created the dictionary from the AOL dataset
by extracting all keywords and their usage frequency from
the 20 million AOLWeb search queries.
5.4 Evaluation metrics
To measure the efficiency of SimAttack, we consider the











where U is the set of users in the system, Qu is the set of
queries sent by user u, Au is the set of queries issued by
user u and successfully retrieved by the adversary, and Au
is specific for each solution: (i) for unlinkability solutions,
Au is the set of queries not issued by the user u but con-
sidered by the attack as sent by u ; (ii) for TMN, Au is the
set of fake queries sent by u identified by the attack as real
queries ; (iii) for GooPIR, Au is the set of queries issued by
u and not retrieved by the attack ; (iv) for TMN over an
unlinkability solution, Au is either the set of fake queries
issued by u identified by the attack as real queries, or the
set of queries not issued by u but considered by the attack
as real queries sent by u ; (v) for GooPIR over an unlink-
ability solution, Au is either the set of queries issued by u
and not retrieved by the attack, or the set of not queries
issued by u but considered by the attack as real queries
sent by u.
To evaluate the trade off between the precision and the
recall, we also consider the F-Measure as the harmonic
mean of precision and recall:
F-Measure = 2 · precision · recallprecision + recall
5.5 Concurrent approach
To compare the performance of SimAttack, we consider
a recent attack using machine learning algorithms [8] as
comparison baseline. This attack targets both unlinkabil-
ity solutions and TMN, and uses Weka [29] as machine
learning framework. In both cases, this attack is based on
two steps: it first builds and trains a model for each user
from its query history (and for TMN, it builds and trains a
model from fake queries), and then it leverages thesemod-
els to de-anonymize anonymous queries or to distinguish
fake queries from real ones.
To de-anonymize anonymous queries, the concurrent
attack uses the Support Vector Machine (SVM) classi-
fier. This choice is motivated by a previous study [30]
that shows that SVM classifier gives better results for
text classification. To implement this attack, we repro-
duce the same condition as reported by the authors: using
LibSVM (i.e., an efficient implementation of SVM), the
same algorithm (i.e., C-SVC), and the same type of kernel
(i.e., linear). We also let the parameter Epsilon (i.e., tol-
erance of termination criterion) to its default value (i.e.,
0.001). However, for parameter C (i.e., cost), Weka offers a
specific option (CVParameterSelection) to find the
value that maximizes the performance of the classifica-
tion. Using this option, we found out that the best value
for C is 1.1.
To distinguish fake queries from real ones, the concur-
rent attack considers several machine learning algorithms:
Logistic Regression, Alternating Decision Trees, Random
Forest, RandomTree and ZeroR. For the sake of simplicity,
we only use the Logistic Regression classifier (reported by
the authors of the attack as the classifier which produces
the best performance), and the SVM classifier (which was
not considered in the previous study).
6 Evaluation of unlinkability solutions
In this section, we evaluate the capacity of SimAttack to
compromise the anonymity of users’ queries protected by
an unlinkability solutions. More precisely, we assess the
sensitivity of SimAttack on unlinkability solutions over
various parameters. Finally, we compare the performance
provided by SimAttack against the performance of the
concurrent machine learning approach.
6.1 Impact of smoothing factor α
As described in Section 4.1, the smoothing parameter α
of SimAttack influences the similarity distance between a
query and the user profile. To measure the impact of this
parameter, we report on Fig. 2 the F-Measure returned
by SimAttack for varying values of α on three different
datasets: AOL100, AOL200, AOL300. We show that α
has a limited impact on the performance of SimAttack
to break the anonymity of users’ queries for all datasets.
For instance, for AOL100, the F-Measure only varies from
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Fig. 2 The smoothing factor α has not a significant impact on the
F-Measure of SimAttack
36.9 to 39.6 %. As the best F-Measure is observed for α
at 0.5, we fixed the parameter α at 0.5 in the remaining
evaluations.
6.2 Impact of the number of users in the system
The probability to associate a query with its correct
requester is inversely proportional to the number of users
in the system. Indeed, the more the users, the more the
possibility to do a wrong mapping increases. To study
the impact of the number of users in the system, Fig. 3
depicts both the recall and precision of SimAttack with
different number of users. Results show that both recall
and precision decrease when the number of users in the
system increases. For instance, SimAttack de-anonymizes
36.7 % of queries with a precision of 42.9 % if we con-
sider 100 users while it only de-anonymizes 11.9 % of
queries with a precision of 17.7 % for 15,000 users. Nev-
ertheless, this decrease is not linear and tends to stabilize
as the number of users increases (around 10 % of recall
for 15,000 users). As consequence, from a certain number
of users, increasing this number does not offer a better
protection.
Fig. 3 Increasing the number of users in the system decreases both
the recall and the precision of SimAttack
6.3 Impact of targeting p users with the highest similarity
instead of the highest one
In the previous sections, we consider that SimAttack suc-
ceeds if the attack returns the correct user. However,
depending on the intentions of the adversary, this latter
might consider that the attack succeeds if the initial user is
among the 3, 5 or 10 most probable users. Consequently,
we adapt SimAttack to link a query to the pmost probable
users. Results of this attack for different number of users
in the system are illustrated in Fig. 4. Obviously, the num-
ber of de-anonymized queries increases according to the
number of users considered by the adversary. However,
this increase is rather small. For instance, the adversary
de-anonymizes in average only 12.9 % more queries if the
10most probable users are targeted compared to targeting
the most probable one (i.e., p = 10 versus p = 1). In addi-
tion, if the adversary considers the 10 most probable users
(i.e., p = 10) while the systems gather 100 users, the recall
only reaches 52.8 %. This results is counter-intuitive, as
the 10 most probable users represent 10 % of the dataset,
this number is expected to be close to 100 % (as there
is a high probability that an initial user is among the 10
most probable users). One possible explanation is that a
large proportion of non-retrieved queries (74.8 % if we
consider 100 users) was not retrieved because they do not
contain keywords that has been already used in the pre-
vious queries of users. Therefore, these queries cannot be
retrieved as their similarity with the user profile equals 0.
6.4 Impact of the number of user profiles
In the previous sections, we consider that the adversary
has pre-built as many user profiles as the number of users
in the system. However, in practice, the adversary might
consider more user profiles than the number of users in
the system. Consequently, we present on Fig. 5 the preci-
sion and the recall of SimAttack when the system gathers
100 users while the adversary considers from 100 to 1,000
user profiles. Results shows that increasing the number of
Fig. 4 The number of de-anonymized queries increases according to
the number of probable users returned by SimAttack
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Fig. 5 Increasing the number of user profiles, with respect to the
number of users in the system, decreases the precision while slightly
reducing the recall
user profiles with the respect to the number of users in the
system decreases the recall. For instance, adding 900 extra
user profiles decreases the recall by 11.3 %. Indeed, the
probability to correctly map queries from users to profile
(i.e., the recall) increases as the number of possible user
profiles decreases. On the contrary, the precision signifi-
cantly increases according to the number of user profiles
considered by the adversary. For instance, introducing 900
extra user profiles increases by 32 % the precision. Indeed,
considering a larger number of user profiles reduces the
number of misclassified queries between all the profiles
and consequently, for a given user profile, the number of
irrelevant queries (i.e., queries belonging to another user)
decreases.
6.5 Impact of the size of the user profiles
The number of past queries of the users used to build the
user profiles, and consequently the size of their profiles,
impacts the efficiency of the unlinkability attack. To mea-
sure this impact, we depict on Fig. 6 the precision and
the recall of SimAttack for AOL100 when the profile of
users pre-built by the adversary only contains a sub part
of their query history (from 0 to 100 %). Results show
Fig. 6 The efficiency of the attack decreases according to the
proportion of queries considered in user profiles
that the efficiency of the attack decreases according to the
proportion of queries considered in user profiles. Consid-
ering 100 % of past queries in user profiles provides 36.7
% of recall while considering only 5 % of queries drops
this value to 16.9 %. This result illustrates that exploiting
less accurate user profiles (i.e., preliminary information
about the users) makes harder for the adversary to de-
anonymization queries. Nevertheless, we note that the
number of de-anonymized queries gently decreases (i.e.,
8.7 %) when the proportion of queries considered in user
profiles drops from 100 to 20 %. As a consequence, from
a certain quantity of queries in a user profile, refining
this profile does not significantly help the adversary to
de-anonymize a higher number of queries.
6.6 Privacy protection
We now compare the performance of both SimAttack and
the concurrent machine learning attack on unlinkability
solutions. Figure 7 measures for both attacks the precision
and the recall for different number of users in the sys-
tem. Results show that both attacks have a similar recall
and precision. For instance, for AOL200, SimAttack has
a recall of 36.8 % and a precision of 41.4 % against 34.4
and 39.1 %, respectively, for the machine learning attack.
Nevertheless, regardless the dataset, SimAttack is slightly
better than the machine learning attack. In average, the F-
Measure of SimAttack is 3 % higher than the F-Measure
obtained with the concurrent attack.
6.7 Scalability
We then compare the performance in term of scalabil-
ity of SimAttack against the concurrent machine learning
approach. More precisely, we evaluate the execution time
required by these two attacks when the number of users
increases. Figure 8 compares the execution time of these
attacks (using a logarithmic scale). The results show that
the execution time for SimAttack increases linearly with
respect to the number of users while this evolution is
exponential for the machine learning attack. In addition,
Fig. 7 SimAttack and the machine learning attack have a similar recall
and precision
Petit et al. Journal of Internet Services and Applications  (2016) 7:2 Page 11 of 17
Fig. 8 SimAttack is faster than the machine learning attack especially
for a high number of users
SimAttack is faster than the machine learning attack espe-
cially for a high number of users. For 1,000 users, the
machine learning attack, including the time to train mod-
els, spends 434,322 sec while SimAttack spends 1,598 sec,
271 times faster. Without considering the time needed
to train models (as the adversary might exploit the same
models for multiple attacks), SimAttack remains faster
than the machine learning (158 times faster).
6.8 Summary
SimAttack is able to de-anonymize a large number of
queries protected by unlinkability solutions. Neverthe-
less, the SimAttack’s capacity of de-anonymizing queries
depends on the number of users in the system, and both
the number and the quality of the preliminary user profiles
collected by the adversary.While SimAttack provides sim-
ilar performances than the concurrent machine learning
attack, SimAttack is much more faster.
7 Evaluation of TrackMeNot
In this section, we evaluate the capacity of SimAttack to
distinguish fake queries sent by TrackMeNot from the real
queries sent by users. More precisely, we assess the sen-
sitivity of SimAttack for TMN over various parameters.
Finally, we compare the performance provided by SimAt-
tack against the performance provided by the concurrent
machine learning approach.
7.1 Impact of smoothing factor δ
As described in Section 4.3, the parameter δ is a threshold
which controls if a query is considered as a fake query or
not. Figure 9 presents the recall, the precision, and the F-
Measure for several values of δ. In this attack, we consider
an adversary which does not have any knowledge about
the generation of fake queries (i.e., the RSS feeds used by
the users). Results show that the value of δ significantly
impacts the performance of SimAttack. The best results in
term of F-Measure are obtained for a δ at 0.5. An adversary
Fig. 9 The value of δ significantly impacts the performance of
SimAttack
considering δ = 0.5 is able to identify 36.8 % of initial
queries with a precision of 62.4 %. Nevertheless, while the
value of δ can be adjusted to achieve a higher precision, it
will be however at the cost of decreasing the recall.
7.2 Impact of the external knowledge
We now analyze the robustness of TMN when SimAt-
tack uses prior knowledge about the RSS feeds of the
users to distinguish fake queries from the users’ queries (as
explained in Section 4.3). Table 1 lists the performances
of SimAttack in term of precision, recall, and F-Measure
in that case. Results show that SimAttack is able to iden-
tify 45.3 % of initial results with a precision of 87.1 %.
Compared to the results obtained by SimAttack when no
prior knowledge are used (i.e., in the previous section),
prior knowledge increases both the recall and the preci-
sion (45.3 % versus 36.8 % for the recall, and 87.1 % versus
62.4 % for the precision). Consequently, prior knowledge
and the generation of fake queries helps the adversary to
break the indistinguishability offered by TMN. Keeping
the default list of RSS feeds of TMN is thus not safe and
can compromise the privacy of user.
7.3 Impact of the number of fake queries
As discussed in Section 5.2, users can define the number
of fake queries sent by TMN. To analyze the impact of
this number, we analyze the robustness of TMN against
SimAttack with varying numbers of fake queries (for 1,
10 and 30 fakes queries per hour while the default value
being 60). These three different settings consist in adding
7,440, 2,480, and 248 fake queries per user, respectively.
Figure 10 depicts the precision and the recall provided by
Table 1 Performance of SimAttack considering an adversary
with prior knowledge about RSS feeds
Recall Precision F-Measure
45.3 % 87.1 % 61.0 %
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Fig. 10 The number of fake queries sent by TrackMeNot only impacts
the precision of SimAttack
SimAttack for both with and without using prior knowl-
edge. Results show that the recall remains unchanged
regardless the number of fake queries (i.e., 36.8 and 45.3 %
with and without using prior knowledge, respectively).
Indeed, changing the number of fake queries does not
affect the profile of users, and thus the same propor-
tion of initial queries is retrieved. However, we show that
the precision decreases as the number of fake queries
increases. Indeed, increasing the number of fake queries
increases accordingly the number of misclassified fake
queries which reduces the precision. Consequently, send-
ing too few fake queries helps the attacker to retrieve
initial queries with a high precision (almost 100 % of
precision for 1 fake query per hour).
7.4 Impact of the size of the user profiles
The number of queries stored in the user profiles impacts
the efficiency of SimAttack. To measure this impact, we
depict on Fig. 11 the precision and the recall of SimAt-
tack for TMN100 when the profile of users pre-built by
the adversary only contains a sub part of their query
history (from 0 to 100 %). Results show that exploiting
smaller user profiles make harder the identification of
user queries by SimAttack. For instance, if we consider
Fig. 11 Exploiting smaller user profiles make harder the identification
of user queries by SimAttack
100 % of the user profiles, SimAttack identifies 36.8 %
or 45.3 % of queries (depending on the exploitation or
not of the prior knowledge) while this number drops to
12.6 % or 15.3 % if we consider only 5 % of the user pro-
files. However, the quality of the attack (i.e., the precision)
increases. For instance, decreasing the number of queries
considered in the user profiles from 100 to 5 % makes the
precision increases from 21.7 to 92 %. Indeed, with less
accurate user profiles, SimAttack does not have enough
information to correctly retrieve the users. Consequently,
increasing the size of user profiles increases the recall
of SimAttack, but also decreases the precision as more
queries get misclassified.
7.5 Privacy protection
We now compare the performance of both SimAttack and
the concurrent machine learning attack on TrackMeNot
using the TMN100 dataset. Firstly for the concurrent
machine learning attack, Table 2 lists the precision, the
recall, and the F-Measure with two different classifiers.
We show that compared to the logistic regression clas-
sifier, the SVM classifier provides better performance in
term of precision while achieving a slightly lower recall.
Interesting enough, the SVM classifier performs better
than the classifiers suggested in [8]. Secondly, as the
machine learning attack requires prior knowledge on the
RSS feeds, we also consider SimAttack using the same
prior knowledge (results depict in Table 1). Results show
that while the recall provided by SimAttack is lower
than the recall provided by the machine learning attack
with both classifiers, SimAttack outperforms the machine
learning attacks in term of precision (87.1 % versus 29.8 %
and 77.8 % for the logistic regression and the SVM, respec-
tively). Finally, SimAttack provides better performance in
term of F-Measure against the machine learning attack for
both classifiers (61.0 % versus 37.4 % and 57.8 % for the
logistic regression and the SVM, respectively).
7.6 Scalability
We finally compare the performance in term of scalabil-
ity to conduct SimAttack on TMN against the concurrent
machine learning approach. More precisely, we measure
the execution time of both attacks (using prior knowl-
edge on RSS feeds) on the TMN100 dataset. Results are
reported in Fig. 12. We show that SimAttack is faster
than the machine learning attack, especially for the logis-
tic regression classifier. The training phase of the machine
Table 2 Performance of the machine learning classifiers on
queries protected by TrackMeNot
Classifier Recall Precision F-Measure
Logistic Regression 54.2 % 29.8 % 37.4 %
Support Vector Machine 46.0 % 77.8 % 57.8 %
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Fig. 12 SimAttack identifies user queries faster than the machine
learning approach for both classifiers
learning attack is the main reason of this long execution
time. Besides, using SimAttack without prior knowledge
will sill reduce its execution time as SimAttack using
prior knowledge spends additional time to build a profile
composed of fake queries.
7.7 Summary
SimAttack succeeds to distinguish a high ratio of fake
queries sent by TrackMeNot. Nevertheless, this ratio
depends on the number of fake queries generated by
TMN, and both the number and the quality of the pre-
liminary user profiles collected by the adversary. Finally,
SimAttack outperforms machine learning attacks and is
faster.
8 Evaluation of GooPIR
In this section, we evaluate the capacity of SimAttack to
distinguish fake queries generated by GooPIR. More pre-
cisely, we assess the sensitivity of SimAttack for GooPIR
over different parameters.
8.1 Impact of the number of fake queries
As discussed in Section 5.3, users can define the number
of fake queries generated by GooPIR. Figure 13 presents
the performance of SimAttack for varying numbers of
additional fake queries (from 1 to 7). Queries are clas-
sified in three categories: Identified, Misclassified and
Unknown. Identified represents the proportion of obfus-
cated queries for which SimAttack retrieves the initial
query (i.e., the recall),Misclassified represents the propor-
tion of obfuscated queries for which SimAttack retrieves
a fake query as initial query, and Unknown represents
the proportion of obfuscated queries for which SimAt-
tack is not able to classify any query as initial query.
Results show that the number of fake queries generated
by GooPIR has a limited impact on the privacy protection
of the user: SimAttack retrieves 60.2 % of initial queries
when only one additional fake query is generated while
50.6 % of initial queries are retrieved when 7 fake queries
Fig. 13 The number of fake queries generated by GooPIR has a
limited impact on the privacy protection of the user
are generated. Besides, regardless the number of fake
queries, the percentage of queries retrieved by SimAttack
remains relatively high (more than half of initial queries
are identified).
We then study why some queries are not identified by
SimAttack (i.e., Misclassified and Unknown queries on
Fig. 13). Results show that the proportion of queries in
the these two categories changes according to the number
of fake queries. For instance, for 1 fake query, unknown
queries represent 78.9 % of non-identified queries while
misclassified queries represent 21.1 %. If we consider 7
fake queries, these percentages change to 40.8 and 59.2 %,
respectively.
8.2 Impact of the size of the user profiles
Similarly to the other versions of SimAttack (i.e., applied
to unlinkability solutions or TrackMeNot), the size of
the user profiles impacts the efficiency of SimAttack on
GooPIR. To measure this impact, we assess the perfor-
mance of SimAttack when the user profiles contains only
a limited part of the user query history (from 0 to 100 %).
Figure 14 depicts for AOL100 dataset, the percentage of
Fig. 14 GooPIR ensures a better protection if the adversary has only a
smaller and inaccurate user profile
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identified queries according to the ratio of the query his-
tory considered in the user profile for varying number of
fake queries generated. Results show that GooPIR ensures
a better protection if the adversary has only a smaller and
inaccurate user profile. For instance, when 7 fake queries
and only 5 % of the query history is considered in the user
profiles, SimAttack retrieves 19.3 % of the initial query
while this percentage increases to 50.6 % if 100 % of the
query history is considered in the user profile. Indeed,
SimAttack bases its identification exclusively on the user
profile. Consequently, if this profile is less accurate, less
user queries are identified.
Furthermore, changing the number of fake queries sig-
nificantly impacts the percentage of identified queries
only if the adversary considered enough queries in the
user profiles. For instance, adding 6 fake queries decreases
by 9.6 % the percentage of query identified when 100 % of
the query history is taken into account in the user profile.
This decrease drops to 3.4 % when only 10 % of the query
history is considered.
8.3 Summary
SimAttack breaks GooPIR protection for more than half
of the queries. In addition, the protection of the query of
users is impacted by the number of fake queries: increas-
ing the number of fake queries offers a better protection.
Moreover, the size of the user profile have an impact
on the performance as non-accurate user profiles make
SimAttack less efficient.
9 Evaluation of indistinguishability over an
unlinkability solution
As shown in the three previous sections, both unlinka-
bility and indistinguishability approaches fail to properly
protect user queries. Therefore, we carried out two fur-
ther experiments which combine these two approaches
(i.e., TrackMeNot and GooPIR over an unlinkability
solution).
9.1 TrackMeNot over an unlinkability solution
In this section, we evaluate a solution composed of Track-
MeNot over an unlinkability solution. Consequently, both
queries of users and fake ones generated by TMN are sent
anonymously. The remaining of this section presents a
sensitivity analysis of the considered solution over various
parameters.
9.1.1 Without prior knowledge on RSS feeds
We now analyze the robustness of TMN over an unlink-
ability solution if the adversary does not consider prior
knowledge on RSS feeds of users. Figure 15 presents the
recall, the precision, and the F-Measure for several val-
ues of δ on the TMN100 dataset. Results show that δ
significantly impacts the performance of SimAttack: the
Fig. 15 The value of δ significantly impacts the performance of
SimAttack
F-Measure varies from 6.4 to 27.3 % and gives it best
value for δ equals 0.8. For this value, an adversary is
able to identify 20.5 % of real queries with a precision
of 40.7 %. Compared to the results obtained with Track-
MeNot alone, adding the unlinkability solution decreases
the recall and the precision (20.5 % versus 36.8 % for the
recall, and 40.7 % versus 62.4 % for the precision). Indeed,
as the adversary does not know the identity of the user,
a lot of queries are now misclassified. In addition, com-
pared to an unlinkability solutions alone (Section 6.2),
combining TMN with an unlinkability solution decreases
the percentage of queries de-anonymized by SimAttack
from 36.7 to 20.5 %. Consequently, using TMN with an
unlinkability solution protects 16.2 % more queries.
9.1.2 With prior knowledge on RSS feeds
We then analyze the performance of SimAttack when the
adversary leverages prior knowledge on the RSS feeds
of the users in order to distinguish fake queries to real
queries. Table 3 lists the recall, the precision, and F-
Measure obtained by the attack. Results show that SimAt-
tack succeeds to identify 35.4 % of the queries of users with
a precision of 14.7 %. Compared to the results of Track-
MeNot alone, adding the unlinkability solution increases
the protection of user’s query, as 9.9 % more queries are
not identified by SimAttack. However, the precision has
significantly dropped: from 87.1 to 14.7 % without and
with the unlinkability solution, respectively. Compared
now to the precision obtained by SimAttack on an unlink-
ability solution alone (see Section 6.2), introducing the
fake queries of TMN decreases the precision from 42.9 to
14.7 %. The decrease of precision is a direct result of the
high ratio of fake queries misclassified.
Table 3 Performance of SimAttack considering an adversary
with prior knowledge on RSS feeds
Recall Precision F-Measure
35.4 % 14.7 % 20.7 %
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Furthermore, compared to the results obtained by
SimAttack when no prior knowledge is considered (i.e.,
Section 9.1.1), SimAttack with prior knowledge increases
by 14.9 % the recall but decreases by 16 % the precision.
Overall, the F-Measure without prior knowledge is higher
than the one with prior knowledge (27.3 versus 20.7 %).
Interesting enough, SimAttack on TMN alone with prior
knowledge provides higher performance than without
prior knowledge (their F-Measures are 61.0 and 46.3 %,
respectively).
9.1.3 Impact of the number of fake queries
We now evaluate the protection offered by TMN over
an unlinkability solution according to the number of fake
queries periodically sent by TMN. Figure 16 presents the
recall and the precision for SimAttack with and with-
out prior knowledge on RSS feeds. Results show that the
number of fake queries does not change the recall (i.e.,
20.5 and 35.4 % without and with using prior knowl-
edge on RSS feeds, respectively). However, the precision
strongly depends on the quantity of fake queries. Indeed,
decreasing the number of fake queries from 60 to 1 fake
query per hour, increases the precision by 31.4 and 32.5 %
(for SimAttack without and with prior knowledge, respec-
tively). Consequently, if the user wants a proper protec-
tion, TMN has to send a high number of fake queries.
9.1.4 Impact of the size of the user profiles
We finally evaluate how the size of the profile impacts
the performance of SimAttack when TrackMeNot is com-
bined with an unlinkability solution. Figure 17 depicts
the recall and the precision of SimAttack with and with-
out prior knowledge for a size of user profile changing
from 0 to 100 %. Similarly to the other versions of SimAt-
tack, smaller user profiles decreases the performance. For
instance, decreasing the size of the user profiles from 100
to 5 % makes SimAttack able to identify 13.8 and 21.7 %
less queries without and with prior knowledge on RSS
Fig. 16 The number of fake queries sent by TrackMeNot over an
unlinkability solution does not change the recall but strongly impact
the precision of SimAttack
Fig. 17 Exploiting smaller user profiles make harder the identification
of the user queries
feeds, respectively. In addition, results show that the pre-
cision decreases according to the size of the user profile.
Nevertheless, considering from 100 to 5 % of the user
profiles, the precision looses 51.2 and 15.0 %, respec-
tively, for SimAttack with and without prior knowledge
on RSS feeds of users. Furthermore, compared to the
results obtained with TrackMeNot alone (Section 7.4),
these results are only slightly lower, excepted for the pre-
cision of SimAttack with both prior knowledge and 5 % of
the user profile, which drops from 96.3 to 14.7 %.
9.2 GooPIR over an unlinkability solution
In this section, we assess a solution combining the obfus-
cation of GooPIR and an unlinkability solution. The
remaining of this section presents a sensitivity analysis of
the considered solution over various parameters.
9.2.1 Impact of the number of fake queries
Firstly, we evaluate the impact of the number of fake
queries generated by GooPIR. As the considered solu-
tion combines GooPIR and an unlinkability solution,
SimAttack needs to retrieve the user query (among the
(k + 1) queries) but also the identity of the user who
issued the protected query (among all users in the sys-
tem). As explained in Section 4.4, SimAttack returns the
most probable pair (query,user). Figure 18 shows the per-
centage of queries retrieved by SimAttack and initially
protected with a varying number of fake queries (from
1 to 7). Results shows that the number of fake queries
has a limited impact on the protection of queries: chang-
ing from 1 to 7 fake queries protects only 9.2 % more
queries. Besides, the percentage of queries retrieved by
the SimAttack remains relatively high (i.e., a recall at 27.6
% for 7 fake queries) considering that queries are pro-
tected by two independent private Web search solutions.
Furthermore, compared to the results of GooPIR alone
(Section 8.1), the current percentage of initial queries
identified is 23 % lower (for 7 fake queries) showing that
adding the unlinkability solution has a huge impact on the
user’s protection.
Petit et al. Journal of Internet Services and Applications  (2016) 7:2 Page 16 of 17
Fig. 18 The number of fake queries has a limited impact on the
protection of queries
9.2.2 Impact of the size of the user profiles
We then evaluate the impact of the size of the user profiles
on the performance of SimAttack when GooPIR is com-
bined with an unlinkability solution. Figure 19 presents
the recall of SimAttack for different proportion of queries
in the user profile (from 0 to 100 %). Results show
that GooPIR over an unlinkability solution protects more
strongly the queries of users if the adversary has smaller
user profiles: for 1 fake query adding by GooPIR, SimAt-
tack identifies 16.1 % of queries when 5 % of the user
profile is considered, while 32.7 % of the queries are iden-
tified when 100 % of the profile is considered. Moreover,
the linearity of the curve (considering the points between
5 to 100 %) means that the more information is own by the
adversary, the more queries she is able to retrieve.
9.2.3 Impact of consideringmore than one pair (query,user)
In the previous sections, we consider that SimAttack suc-
ceeds if the attack returns the correct pair (query,user).
However, an adversary can be interested to consider more
probable pairs. We report on Fig. 20 the recall of SimAt-
tack considering different number of pairs: from 1 to 10
pairs. Results show that the recall increases according
to the number of pairs considered by the adversary. For
Fig. 19 Exploiting smaller user profiles make harder the identification
of the user queries by SimAttack
Fig. 20 The recall slightly increases according to the number of pairs
(query, user) returned by SimAttack
instance, considering 10 pairs instead on 1 makes the
recall increases in average by 13.4 %. Nevertheless, this
recall improvement remains relatively low.
9.3 Summary
Combining an indistinguishability technique (i.e., Track-
MeNot or GooPIR) over an unlinkability solution gives
a better protection to the queries of user, especially if
the adversary is not able to collect a large quantity of
information about the user or if the user configures its
indistinguishability solution to sent a high number of fake
queries. Nevertheless, in most of cases, the adversary is
still able to retrieve a non-negligible proportion of user
queries.
10 Conclusion
This paper presents SimAttack, a generic attack that
targets popular private Web search solutions. SimAt-
tack leverages a similarity metric to capture the distance
between a query and pre-built user profiles gathering
preliminary information about the user interests. We
exhaustively evaluate SimAttack using a real world Web
search dataset. We show that SimAttack succeeds to de-
anonymize, or retrieve among fake queries a high ratio of
initial queries from user.
Our analysis shows that neither unlinkability solutions,
nor TrackMeNot and GooPIR protects properly the users.
Besides, we study the combination of TrackMeNot and
GooPIR over an unlinkability solution. The first combi-
nation (i.e., TrackMeNot over an unlinkability solution)
gives a satisfactory protection when enough fake queries
are periodically sent. However, this solution generates an
important overhead in term of message on the network.
The second combination (i.e., GooPIR over an unlinkabil-
ity solution) still suffers from a high ratio of initial queries
identified by SimAttack.
Dynamically evaluating protected queries in order to
measure their level of protection over time represents an
interesting research agenda for future works. For instance,
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thanks to this dynamic assessment, it will be possible to
adapt the queries protection before sending them, and to
reinforce the user awareness.
Endnote
1How the adversary collects preliminary information
remains outside the scope of this paper.
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